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CLOSURE OF PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION HEARINGS:
RESOLVING THE FAIR TRIAL/FREE PRESS CONFLICT
-[Tihe true measure of our society will not be judged by the free-
dorn we grant to our great institutions as much as by the protection
we provide for society's lowliest member. And none are more
lowly-none more subject to potential abuse-and none with more
at stake than those who have been indicted and face criminal
prosecution in our courts. For them, freedom and fair trial are not
abstractions." *
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a growing number of cases in which the
sixth amendment right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial by an
impartial jury' conflicts with the first amendment interests of the
public, and in particular the press, 2 in open judicial proceedings. 3
Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 444, 399
N.E.2d 518, 526, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630. 638 (1979).
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides, in part, that '[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury...." This right has been incorporated by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to apply against the states. See In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 272-73 (1948).
2. The press is viewed as the agent of the public. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment);
Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 540, 419 A.2d 323, 330 (1980) (Hill, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton,
267 S.E.2d 544, 549 (W. Va. 1980), see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 491-92 (1975) (individual in modern society relies upon press for knowledge of
government functions); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) ("A responsi-
ble press has always be~n regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial adminis-
tration, especially in the criminal field.").
3. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court,
30 Cal. 3d 498, 638 P.2d 655, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982); Cromer v. Superior Court,
109 Cal. App. 3d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1980); State v. Burak, 431 A.2d 1246
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1981); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982); State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977); Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Van
Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1983); Kansas City Star Co. v. Fossey, 230 Kan. 240,
630 P.2d 1176 (1981); Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980); State v. Birdsong, 422 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1982); State ex rel. Smith v.
District Court, 654 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1982); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court,
608 P.2d 116 (Mont. 1980); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977); State ex
rel. New Mexico Press Ass'n v. Kaufman, 648 P.2d 300 (N.M. 1982); Westchester
Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 399 N.E.2d 518, 423
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980); Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 419 A.2d 323
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These competing interests were characterized by Justice Black as "two
of the most cherished policies of our civilization"; 4 any conflict be-
tween them has important implications for both the criminal justice
system and the news media. A conflict between the right of the
defendant to a fair trial and the demand of the press for access
frequently arises at pretrial suppression hearings.
The typical conflict occurs with regard to a sensational murder
prosecution that receives extensive press coverage. 5 Generally, at a
pretrial hearing the defendant will move to suppress a confession or
other highly incriminating evidence.6 Evidence in a sensational case
may be inadmissible despite being highly probative of the defendant's
guilt.7 As public outrage sparks interest in the case, the danger of
permitting public access to such evidence multiplies." In order to
prevent the widespread publicizing of evidence that may later be
inadmissible at trial, the defendant may also move to exclude the
public and the press from the hearing. 9 Cases of this nature require
(1980); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 281 S.E.2d
915 (1981); Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716 (Wash. 1982); Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982); State v. Hughes, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2569 (Wash. Super.
Ct. Oct. 4, 1982); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va.
1980); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1979).
4. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
5. See, e.g., Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980); State v. Birdsong, 422 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (La. 1982); Great Falls Tribune
v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 121 (Mont. 1980) (Sheehy, J., dissenting); Seattle
Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 722 (Wash. 1982).
6. E.g., State v. Birdsong, 422 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (La. 1982); Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 579, 281 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1981).
7. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977) (confession obtained in viola-
tion of defendant's right to advice of counsel inadmissible); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (evidence obtained through interrogation inadmissible at
trial unless prosecution demonstrates defendant's waiver of fifth amendment rights),
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964) (involuntary confession inadmissible
in state and federal trials); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence seized
in violation of fourth amendment inadmissible in state trials); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (evidence seized as an indirect result of
fourth amendment violation inadmissible at trial); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914) (evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment inadmissible in
federal trials); see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939) (evidence
obtained as a result of knowledge gained from illegal wiretap inadmissible because it
is "a fruit of the poisonous tree"); Fed. R. Evid. 403.
8. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 443 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) ("[A]s the public interest intensifies, so does the
potential for prejudice.").
9. E.g., State v. Birdsong, 422 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (La. 1982); Great Falls
Tribune v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 118 (Mont. 1980); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 579, 281 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1981). This Note
does not consider the closure of hearings under rape shield laws, which are designed
to protect victims from discussion of sensitive information and to encourage future
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that the rights of the accused "be most zealously guarded," 10 and yet it
is in these cases that the public interest in an open proceeding is the
greatest. "
The Supreme Court first considered the right of a defendant to close
a pretrial suppression hearing in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.12 The
Court held that the public trial provision of the sixth amendment
exists solely for the benefit of the criminal defendant and does not
confer any constitutional right of access to such hearings upon the
media or the general public.1 3 On behalf of four dissenters, Justice
Blackmun disagreed. He argued that the sixth amendment public trial
provision is the very foundation of the public's right to an open
judicial proceeding.' 4 He maintained that the sixth amendment serves
societal interests existing alongside, and sometimes in opposition to,
the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.' 5 An open
proceeding, according to Justice Blackmun, deters perjury, serves as a
check on judicial abuses, enables the public to scrutinize police and
government conduct and educates the public in the operation of the
criminal justice system.16
Seven members of the Gannett Court expressly reserved the ques-
tion whether the first amendment guarantees the public any right of
access.17 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, was the only mem-
ber of the Court willing to give explicit recognition to such a first
amendment right.' 8 Justice Rehnquist joined the Gannett opinion but
wrote separately to reject Justice Powell's approach in favor of a broad
rule, based on the sixth amendment, that would allow the defendant
to close the proceeding without a stated reason, provided the prosecu-
tor and judge consented.' 9 With respect to pretrial suppression hear-
victims to testify, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2620-21
(1982), because the government interest in closure of such proceedings relates to the
rights of the victim, not those of the accused.
10. State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 551 (W. Va.
1980).
11. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 447-48, 414 A.2d 318, 332-33 (Kauff-
man, J., concurring), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980); Stern, Free Press/Fair Trial
The Role of the News Media in Developing and Advancing Constitutional Processes,
29 Okla. L. Rev. 349, 358 (1976); see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Common-
wealth, 222 Va. 574, 587, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (1981).
12. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
13. Id. at 394: see id. at 381 & n.9.
14. Id. at 436 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 415-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 427-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17. Justice Stewart wrote for the plurality and was joined in his reservation of the
first amendment issue by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens. See id. at 392.
Justices Blackmun, White, Brennan and Marshall dissented, but they also reserved
the first amendment issue. Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
18. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ings, therefore, Gannett resolved one of the two constitutional ques-
tions regarding public access; the public may not use the sixth
amendment to get its foot inside the courtroom door.20
One year later, the Court was presented with the same conflict, this
time with respect to a trial. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,21 the seven Justices who had reserved the first amendment issue
in Gannett22 concluded that the right of the public to attend a crimi-
nal trial 23 is implicit in the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech. 24 In finding this first amendment right of access, the plurality
opinion written by Chief Justice Burger applied the same reasoning
that the Gannett dissent used in the context of the sixth amendment .25
Justice Powell took no part in the opinion,26 and Justice Rehnquist
reiterated his view that no right of access is conferred upon the press
or public by either the first or sixth amendment. 27
The opinions in Ganneft and Richmond, as well as the factual
differences in the two cases, leave two significant questions to be
resolved with respect to pretrial suppression hearings. The first is
whether the societal interests justifying the first amendment right of
public access to trials will support the extension of that right to the
pretrial suppression hearing. Assuming that the Court would recog-
nize a strong public interest, if not a constitutional right, in free access
to pretrial suppression hearings, the second question is what standard
should govern the weighing of this public interest against the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial. Part I of this Note examines the right of a
criminal defendant to a fair trial under the sixth amendment. Part II
explores the basis for the putative public right of access to pretrial
proceedings. Part III suggests a balancing test to be applied when this
interest conflicts with the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The defendant should be required to make a threshold showing of a
reasonable likelihood that press coverage would jeopardize his consti-
tutional guarantee of a fair trial. Given such a showing, the court
should then examine reasonable alternatives to closure that would
adequately protect this right, while also protecting first amendment
20. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 603 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
21. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
22. Justice Rehnquist dissented in Richmond. Id. at 604. Justice Powell took no
part in the decision. Id. at 581. See supra note 17.
23. The Court explicitly limited its decision to the actual trial; it did not consider
hearings on pretrial motions. See id. at 563-64.
24. Id. at 580.
25. Id. at 569-78; see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 434-36 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
26. 448 U.S. at 581.
27. Id. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
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interests in access to judicial proceedings. If no such alternatives
existed, closure would be justified. A record of these closed proceed-
ings would be made and released to the public at the earliest time
consistent with protecting the defendant's sixth amendment right.
I. THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A FAIR TRIAL
The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant in a criminal case
the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 28 The trial judge is
charged with preserving this right by minimizing the effects of preju-
dicial publicity.29 Among his responsibilities are to avoid a "carnival
atmosphere"30 at trial and to ensure that each juror makes his decision
solely upon evidence developed at trial. 31
Pretrial publicity adverse to the accused poses a great threat to the
impartiality of a jury and thus to the possibility of a fair trial. 32 This
threat increases when the information publicized is obtained from a
pretrial suppression hearing. 33 Such a hearing is held outside the
presence of the jury to determine whether evidence implicating the
defendant was illegally obtained. 34 If the prosecution fails to disprove
allegations of impropriety, the evidence is inadmissible at trial despite
its relevance and probative value. 35
28. See supra note 1.
29. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976).
30. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
31. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); id. at 729-30 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
32. As Justice Frankfurter noted: "How can fallible men and women reach a
disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they heard in court when, before they
entered the jury box, their minds were saturated by press and radio for months
preceding by matter designed to establish the guilt of the accused." Id. at 729-30
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 443 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part), United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1345 (D.C
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying
text.
34. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1967); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 394-95 (1964); see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 480 (1972).
35. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence seized in violation of
fourth amendment inadmissible in state trials); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-
77 (1964) (involuntary confession inadmissible in state and federal trials), Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence seized in violation of fourth
amendment inadmissible in federal trials). See generally 1 W. Ringel, Searches &
Seizures, Arrests and Confessions §§ 3.1-.2 (exclusionary rule), 24.1-.5 (inadmissible
confessions) (1982). The Supreme Court is considering, in Illinois v. Gates, a modifi-
cation of the exclusionary rule which would make it inapplicable to evidence ob-
tained when police officers had a reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue
was constitutional. Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1983) (No. 81-
430) (argued Mar. 1, 1983).
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Opening the pretrial suppression hearing to the public may expose
the potential venire to this highly incriminating evidence. As a result,
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to impanel an impartial jury.36
As the Supreme Court stated in Sheppard v. Maxwell: 37 -[E]xclusion
of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news media
make it available to the public. ' 3 However, because the great major-
ity of criminal cases, never proceed to a trial on the merits, 39 a pretrial
suppression hearing is often the best, and sometimes the only, forum
for public review of police, prosecutorial and judicial conduct. 40
The pretrial suppression hearing may thus be the most critical stage
of a criminal proceeding for both the defendant and the public.
Because of the perceived threat to his fair trial right, the defendant
may seek to have the hearing closed to both the press and public. At
this point, the defendant's fair trial right stands in direct conflict with
the public's putative right of access to pretrial proceedings.
II. THE BASIS FOR A PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
A. Common-Law Access to Judicial Proceedings
Trials at common law were traditionally open to the public. 4' This
publicity at common law was viewed not as a means of protecting the
personal rights of the accused, 42 but rather as a means of improving
the quality of testimony and the performance of officers of the court.4 3
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,44 the Court relied heavily
on this common-law presumption of publicity in finding a first
amendment right of access to trials.45
36. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1979); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); San Jose Mercury-Nevs v. Munic-
ipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 512, 638 P.2d 655, 663, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 780 (1982).
37. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
38. Id. at 360.
39. In the federal courts in 1980, over 80 % of the criminal defendants had their
cases disposed of without a trial on the merits. See Annual Report of the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 282 (1980).
40. See infra notes 73, 76 and accompanying text.
41. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) (plurality
opinion); id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally, 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1834, at 435-42 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) (discussing the advantages of providing
public access to trial proceedings).
42. Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979) (sixth amend-
ment rights are personal to the accused). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. 6 J. Wigmore, supra note 41, § 1834, at 435, 438.
44. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
45. Id. at 564-73 (plurality opinion). Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice
Burger stated: "What is significant for present purposes is that throughout its evolu-
tion, the trial has been open to all who cared to observe." Id. at 564; id. at 589
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 601 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
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Yet the presumptive openness relied upon by Richmond did not
apply to the pretrial hearings that existed at common law.46 More-
over, the modern suppression hearing has no direct counterpart in the
common law.47 Consequently, the common-law presumption of access
to trials is an inappropriate foundation for a public right of access to
pretrial suppression hearings.
B. A First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings?
The strongest argument for a public right of access to pretrial
suppression hearings is based upon the free speech and free press
clauses of the first amendment. 48 Two themes appear central in judi-
cial justifications of first amendment freedoms. The first is the infor-
mational function that freedom of expression has in individual fulfill-
ment and self-expression. 49 The second is the structural value of
freedom of expression in a system of representative democracy. 50 In
46. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 (1979); id. at 394-96 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
In Rex v. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253 (N.P. 1811), the editor of a
London newspaper was indicted for publishing the testimony given by an alleged
rape victim in a preliminary examination. Lord Ellenborough held:
If anything is more important than another in the administration of justice,
it is that jurymen should come to the trial of those persons on whose guilt or
innocence they are to decide, with minds pure and unprejudiced....
Trials at law fairly reported, although they may occasionally prove injuri-
ous to individuals, have been held to be privileged. Let them continue so
privileged. The benefit they produce is great and permanent, and the evil
that arises from them is rare and incidental. But these preliminary examina-
tions have no such privilege. Their only tendency is to prejudge those whom
the law still presumes to be innocent, and to poison the sources of justice.
Id. at 570-72, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1255.
47. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 n.17 (1979); id. at 437
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
48. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. Const. amend. I. Both clauses
have been incorporated through the fourteenth amendment to apply against the
states. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (free speech); Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (free press).
49. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 861-62 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 725-27 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 726-27 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.").
See generally A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 19-28 (1960) (interpreting first
amendment freedom of speech clause).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , the Supreme Court held
for the first time that the first amendment implicitly guarantees to the
public, and therefore to the press, the right to attend a criminal
trial. 52 The question remains, however, whether these judicial justifi-
cations support a constitutional right of access to pretrial suppression
hearings.
1. The Informational Role of the First Amendment
Although the first amendment has traditionally protected the right
of a speaker to disseminate information, 53 the correlative right of an
audience to receive such information has recently been recognized as
well. 54 Promotion of this free exchange presumes that the speaker is in
possession of the information that he wishes to disseminate. 5 In the
case of a pretrial closure, however, the government is unwilling to
communicate and therefore the press is without information to pub-
lish. Because a closure order stems the flow of information at its
source, it has been termed the "functional equivalent of a prior re-
straint on speech or publication. ' 56 While this right to speak and
publish is protected from prior restraint, 57 it "does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information."5 8
Clearly, the informational role of the first amendment will be
frustrated whenever obstacles are placed before those seeking to
51. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
52. Id. at 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 584 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concur-
ring in judgment); id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); see id. at 604
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
53. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Pell v. Procu-
nier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (per curiam); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16
(1931).
54. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2808 (1982); Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63
(1972).
55. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
56. Note, The Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions in a Continu-
ing Struggle, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 1013, 1031 (1978); see State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132,
144, 373 A.2d 377, 382-83 (1977); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 111,
389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722 (1976) (per curiam), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d
544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), afJ'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Williams v. Stafford, 589
P.2d 322, 331 (Wyo. 1979) (Raper, C.J., dissenting).
57. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718-19 (1931).
58. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
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gather information. The right to gather information directly from an
unwilling source, however, has never been recognized in the context
of a pretrial suppression hearing.59 Indeed, while it cannot recapture
information that is leaked to outside sources, 60 the government does
enjoy "'substantial latitude in deciding what information to hold secret
and can enforce its policy of secrecy against itself and its employ-
ees."6'
This distinction between the right to gather and the right to dissem-
inate separates the closure of a pretrial suppression hearing from the
prior restraint held unconstitutional in Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart.62 In Nebraska Press, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, made it clear that closure was not equivalent to prior restraint;
in fact it was recommended as a less drastic means of safeguarding the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 63 Closure of a pretrial suppression
hearing is not a prior restraint because the prospective speaker has no
information the publication of which is prevented. Accordingly, a
right to gather, and thus disseminate, information from such hearings
59. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("This
Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all
sources of information within government control."). The press has no right of access
to information not generally available to the public. Id. at 11 (plurality opinion);
accord Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1974): Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). The
right to gather information from such a source, conferred in Richmond, was applied
solely to the criminal trial. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
563-64 (1980) (plurality opinion).
60. The press has a right to communicate information that has been leaked or
stolen from an unwilling government source. Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); see New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
61. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 71 (Supp. 1979). Professor Emerson
has argued: "On the basis of the employment relation, the government can instruct
its officials on matters of expression and discipline them for failure to comply. This is
the chief method for protecting an accused against government expression that may
impair his right to a fair trial." T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
709 (1970); see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).
62. 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
63. Id. at 564 & n.8. Clearly, Chief Justice Burger did not view closures as prior
restraints because closure was discussed as an alternative means of blunting "the
impact of pretrial publicity." Id. at 564. The majority opinion in Gannett dispelled
any doubts with respect to the Court's view on this issue. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979). The Court stated:
Nebraska Press . . .involved a direct prior restraint . . .prohibiting [the
press] from disseminating information . . . . '[T]he chief purpose of the
[First Amendment's] guaranty [is] to prevent previous restraints upon publi-
cation' . . . .The exclusion order in the present case, by contrast, did not
prevent the petitioner from publishing any information in its possession.
Id. at 393 n.25 (citations omitted) (quoting Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (1931)).
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cannot be predicated on the first amendment's role in promoting the
free flow of information.
2. The Structural Role of the First Amendment
In addition to the first amendment's informational role, Justice
Brennan in Richmond noted its structural role 64 in securing and fos-
tering the communication necessary for vital and intelligent participa-
tion in a representative democracy. 65 Examining this structural role,
Justice Brennan, as had the dissenters in Gannett, focused on the
importance of open judicial proceedings in our society. 6
Several societal interests support a first amendment right of access
to trials. The first of these, public confidence in the judicial system,6 7
results from the "perception of fairness" promoted by access to judicial
proceedings. 68 When members of the public, or of the press as the
public's representative, 69 are able to observe these proceedings first-
hand, they are assured that the proceedings are conducted fairly.
Second, access to judicial proceedings educates the public about the
nature of the judicial system.70 A third interest served by public access
to criminal proceedings is the beneficial venting of community hostil-
ity and emotion.7' This outlet helps minimize the likelihood of self-
help reactions on the part of the affected community.72
64. For a more detailed discussion by Justice Brennan of the structural model of
the role of the press, see Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173
(1979). Professor BeVier has criticized Justice Brennan's structural model of the first
amendment in BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Rich-
mond Newspapers, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 311, 331-39 (1982).
65. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-89 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 593-97 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt.
529, 536, 419 A.2d 323, 327 (1980) (Billings, J., concurring); cf. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 427-33 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) (importance of open judicial proceedings supports sixth amendment right
of access).
67. 448 U.S. at 571-72 (plurality opinion); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d
550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982); see Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78
Colum. L. Rev. 1308, 1310 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Right to Attend]; cf. United
States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978) (importance of public confi-
dence supports sixth amendment right of access).
68. 448 U.S. at 570 (plurality opinion) (noting "nexus between openness, fair-
ness, and the perception of fairness"); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 429
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (importance of "appear-
ance of justice"); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[Jlustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.").
69. See supra note 2.
70. See 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (plurality
opinion) ("When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows .... Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
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These societal interests are also furthered at pretrial suppression
hearings. Typically these hearings are the best forum for reviewing
the propriety of police conduct. 3 Because this conduct frequently
occurs outside the public view, "beneficial public scrutiny may never
take place if not at the hearing .... .74 The overwhelming majority
of criminal cases never reach trial; 7" therefore pretrial proceedings are
also the principal forum for public scrutiny of judges and prosecu-
tors. 70 Many criminal defendants virtually have their guilt or inno-
cence determined at the pretrial suppression hearing.7 7 For them, as
well as the public, this is often the "most critical stage of a criminal
proceeding." 
7 8
On the other hand, society's therapeutic interest in open proceed-
ings is precisely the danger that closure seeks to reduce. By mobilizing
potentially hostile public emotion, pretrial publicity makes it difficult
to locate jurors who have not formed an opinion concerning the guilt
of the accused. 7
9
Lower courts disagree whether these common societal interests jus-
tify the extension of a constitutional right of public access to pretrial
proceedings. 80 The Supreme Court, however, has displayed, in both
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostil-
ity, and emotion." (citation omitted)); see Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video
and Audio Tape Evidence: A Threat to the Fair Trial Right, 50 Fordham L. Rev.
551, 561 (1982) ("community cathartic effect in cleansing society of the criminal")
[hereinafter cited as Broadcasting Tape Evidence].
72. 448 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion).
73. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir.
1982), Right to Attend, supra note 67, at 1309-10 & n.11.
74. United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
75. See supra note 39.
76. United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982); Right to Attend,
supra note 67, at 1309-10; see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But cf. The Supreme Court,
197.9 Term, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 152 (1980) (open proceedings desirable but not
properly the subject of first amendment guarantees).
77. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 434 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); see id. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring); United
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556-57 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cianfrani,
573 F.2d 835, 850 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir.
1973); Right to Attend, supra note 67, at 1310 n.13. For examples of two such
instances, see Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 531, 419 A.2d 323, 324 (1980)
(suppression motion denied, defendant entered plea); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 581 & n.5, 281 S.E.2d 915, 918 & n.5 (1981) (same).
78. United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982).
79. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729-39 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
accord Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1979).
80. Compare United States v. Chagra, No. 82-1263, slip op. at 3429 (5th Cir.
Mar. 14, 1983) (first amendment guarantees public right of access to bail reduction
hearings) and United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1982)
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Gannett8' and Richmond, 2 an increasing regard for the importance
to our society of open judicial proceedings, although only Justice
Powell has explicitly recognized a first amendment right of the public
to be present at suppression hearings. 83 While the Court as a whole
has given no indication that this societal interest will be elevated to a
constitutional right, 4 it is likely to grant the interest enough protec-
(first amendment guarantees public right of access to pretrial suppression hearings)
and United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982) (same) and United
States v. Dorfman, 550 F. Supp. 877, 884 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same) and United States
v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1344 (D.C. 1981) (first amendment guarantees public
right of access to pretrial detention hearing), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) and
Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (first
amendment guarantees public right of access to pretrial suppression hearings) and
State v. Williams, No. A-140, slip op. at 18 (N.J. Apr. 26, 1983) (first amendment
guarantees right of access to bail reduction and probable cause hearings) and Herald
Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 536, 419 A.2d 323, 327-28 (1980) (Billings, J., concur-
ring) (same) and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 588,
281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (1981) (same) with San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court,
30 Cal. 3d 498, 506, 638 P.2d 655, 659-60, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776-77 (1982) (no
right of access under federal constitution to pretrial suppression hearings) and State
v. Burak, 431 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981) (same).
81. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979); id. at 427-36 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-74 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion). Although the Richmond Court relied in its holding on the "'unbroken,
uncontradicted history," id. at 573 (plurality opinion), of open judicial proceedings,
the Court noted that the issue presented in Richmond was one of first impression. Id.
at 563-64 (plurality opinion).
83. See supra note 18.
84. In order to avoid speculation whether the Supreme Court will apply the
Richmond first amendment rationale to pretrial proceedings, many state courts rely
on state constitutional provisions to support a more expansive right of access than
that conferred by Gannett or Richmond. E.g., Iowa Freedom of Information Coun-
cil v. Van Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 923-24 (Iowa 1983); Ashland Publishing Co. v.
Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Birdsong, 422 So. 2d
1135, 1139 (La. 1982) (Dennis, J., dissenting); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court,
608 P.2d 116, 119-20 (Mont. 1980); State v. Williams, No. A-140, slip op. at 22 (N.J.
Apr. 26, 1983): Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 588,
281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (1981); Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 719 (Wash.
1982); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 546-47 (W. Va.
1980). Contra San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 506-09,
638 P.2d 655, 660-62, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 777-79 (1982) (no unqualified right of
access granted by state constitution); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 426-28,
414 A.2d 318, 321-22 (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980).
Such state interpretations may present constitutional problems. While the state is
free to interpret its public trial provision more broadly than the corresponding
federal guarantee, it may not use the state constitution to support the infringement of
the defendant's federal guarantee of a fair trial. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal
Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 507, 638 P.2d 655, 660, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 777 (1982)
("[S]tate-created rights may not, of course, be elevated above countervailing federal
guarantees."); accord Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 130
(Mont. 1980) (Sheehy, J., dissenting); The State Trial Judge's Book 266 (2d ed. 1969).
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tion so that it must be accommodated whenever so doing will not
jeopardize the sixth amendment right of the defendant.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
The right to a fair trial, "the most fundamental of all freedoms,"' 5
is an essential requirement of due process . 6 Against this right must be
set the interest of the public and the press in access to pretrial suppres-
sion hearings. Even those states that have recognized a constitutional
right of access based on a state public trial provision have held that
this right is not absolute, 7 and must be weighed against the fair trial
right of the defendant. This fair trial right transcends the societal
interest in access when both cannot be accommodated. 8
A. Closure- The First Alternative
Closure is an appropriate method of reconciling these conflicting
interests. It has the dual benefits of avoiding a prohibited prior re-
straint89 and of shielding potential jurors from prejudicial informa-
tion.90 Additionally, any burden upon societal interests that is caused
But see State v. Williams, No. A-140, slip op. at 41 n.19 (N.J. Apr. 26, 1983) ("[W]e
are confident that the defendant's countervailing right to a fair trial can still be
preserved and will remain uncompromised."). Extended discussion of the constitu-
tional implications of these state provisions is beyond the scope of this Note.
85. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
86. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
87. Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980); State v. Birdsong, 422 So. 2d 1135, 1137 n.2 (La. 1982); id. at 1139 (Dennis,
J., dissenting); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 119 (Mont.
1980); Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 719 (Wash. 1982); State ex rel.
Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 550 (W. Va. 1980); cf. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 398 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (advocating federal
constitutional right of access).
88. Cromer v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 728, 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. 671,
673-74 (1980); State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 654 P.2d 982, 986 (Mont. 1982);
Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 725 (Wash. 1982) (Dore, J., concur-
ring); see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion) ("defendant's superior right to a fair trial"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966) ("ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused"). As Professor Emerson has stated:
Government expression, like private expression, at times must be recon-
ciled with individual or social interests outside the system of freedom of
expression. Thus government expression may... deny [a person] the right
to a fair trial .... Regulation or prohibition of government expression
having these effects would not appear to raise any problem under the First
Amendment.
T. Emerson, supra note 61, at 708.
89. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
90. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1979); State v. Birdsong,
422 So. 2d 1135, 1136-37 (La. 1982).
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by closure may be minimized by releasing the transcript of the hearing
when the threat to the defendant's sixth amendment right has
passed. 91
1. Establishing the Threat to the Fair Trial Right
Trials are presumptively open. 92 Because the presumption of open-
ness may apply to pretrial proceedings as well, 93 the party seeking
closure should bear the initial burden of persuading the trial court
that the threat to his fair trial right mandates the closure of his
suppression hearing. 94 To establish such a threat, the defendant may
introduce testimony concerning the extent of the hostile publicity
already given his alleged crimes. 95 Inflammatory or distorted public-
ity is not the only threat to a fair trial. Even accurate reporting may
be prejudicial if it causes a potential juror to predetermine the guilt of
the accused.96 Circulation and distribution statistics of the papers
objecting to closure will also be considered in an effort to determine
the extent of the possible prejudicial effect on potential jurors.97
The subject matter of the hearing is another factor to be weighed in
considering the extent of the threat to a fair trial. Pretrial suppression
hearings are often concerned with the procedural circumstances under
91. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979); Ashland Publishing
Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). But see Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 442 n.17 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (transcript not always an adequate substitute for actual presence):
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (time delay "'not unimport-
ant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of bringing news to the public
promptly").
92. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 & n.17 (1980)
(plurality opinion); accord Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 543 419 A.2d 323,
332 (1980) (Hill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
93. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
94. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Herald Ass'n
v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 542, 419 A.2d 323, 331-32 (1980) (Hill, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.
574, 590, 281 S.E.2d 915, 924 (1981); Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716,
720 (Wash. 1982); II American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice 8-
3.2, at 8-35 commentary (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Standards].
95. E.g., San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 513 &
n.15, 638 P.2d 655, 664 & n.15, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 781 & n.15 (1982); State v.
Birdsong, 422 So. 2d 1135, 1138 n.7 (La. 1982); Westchester Rockland Newspapers,
Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 447, 399 N.E.2d 518, 528, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 641
(1979) (Cooke, C.J., concurring); see State v. Burak, 431 A.2d 1246, 1247 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1981).
96. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 512, 638 P.2d
655, 663, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 780 (1982); see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-28
(1961).
97. See supra note 95.
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which evidence was obtained and not with its substantive content. 9
Access to this type of hearing, if carefully controlled, may present a
lesser threat to the fair trial right of the defendant because the risk of
disclosure of prejudicial information is reduced. 99
2. Appropriate Standards for Closure
The American Bar Association (ABA) and the federal Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules (Advisory Committee) have advocated
different standards for determining when the closure of a pretrial
hearing by the trial judge is justified. The stricter view, set forth by
the ABA, permits closure only upon a judge's finding that "the dissem-
ination of information from the pretrial proceeding and its record
would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial." 100
This standard reflects the positions taken by the Department of Justice
in its guidelines for United States Attorneys and by Justice Blackmun
in Gannett.' 0'
The less strict standard, suggested by the Advisory Committee in
the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 02 would permit closure upon a judge's finding "that there is a
reasonable likelihood that dissemination of information from the pro-
ceeding would interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury." 0 3 This standard is substantially similar to that advo-
98. Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 542, 419 A.2d 323, 331 (1980) (Hill, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton,
267 S.E.2d 544, 551 (W. Va. 1980); see State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 654
P.2d 982, 988 (Mont. 1982).
99. State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 654 P.2d 982, 988 (Mont. 1982); Herald
Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 542, 419 A.2d 323, 331 (1980) (Hill, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S.E.2d 544,
551 (W. Va. 1980).
100. ABA Standards, supra note 94, at 8-3.2. This standard has been adopted in a
number of jurisdictions. E.g., Kansas City Star Co. v. Fosey, 230 Kan. 240, 247-48,
630 P.2d 1176, 1181-84 (1981); State ex rel. Smith v. District Court, 654 P.2d 982,
987 (Mont. 1982); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 325-26 (Wyo. 1979); see, e.g.,
State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 912 (Fla.
1977) (Sundberg, J., concurring); Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Van
Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 925-26 (Iowa 1983); cf. State v. Williams, No. A-140, slip
op. at 29-30 (N.J. Apr. 26, 1983) (trial judge must be "clearly satisfied" that there is a
"realistic likelihood of prejudice"); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267
S.E.2d 544, 551 (W. Va. 1980) (clear likelihood of irreparable damage).
101. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 441 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (substantial probability that alternatives to closure
will not adequately protect fair trial right); 28 C.F.R § 50.9(c)(6)(i) (1982) (failure to
close proceedings will produce substantial likelihood of denial of fair trial right);
accord United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982).
102. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 91
F.R.D. 289 (Prelim. Draft 1981) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Stan-
dard].
103. Id. at 365-66.
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cated by a federal judicial conference committee' °4 and by Justice
Powell, the only Justice to weigh the fair trial right of the accused
directly against the first amendment interests of the press in the
context of a pretrial closure. 105
The Advisory Committee standard is superior to the "more rigor-
ous"' 0 6 ABA standard for two reasons: first, the crucial distinction
between a prior restraint and a denial of access; and second, the
unfairness to the defendant of requiring him to meet a clear and
present danger test when the dissemination of information is not being
wholly prevented, but merely delayed.107
The ABA standard is based upon the standard applied by the Su-
preme Court in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,'0 8 a prior re-
straint case.' 0 9 The denial of access to a pretrial suppression hearing,
however, is not a prior restraint upon the media."10 This onerous
standard of proof should therefore not be required of a defendant
seeking to close such a hearing in order to protect his sixth amendment
right. Moreover, this strict standard would in effect subordinate the
constitutional right of the accused to the interests of the media and the
public. As Justice Powell noted in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,'" "[i]t
104. Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, Revised
Report on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 518, 534-35 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Judicial Conference Report]. This standard has been adopted in a
number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Chagra, No. 82-1263, slip op. at
3430-31 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 1983); State v. Burak, 431 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1981) (likelihood of prejudice to defendant's fair trial right); State v. Birdsong,
422 So. 2d 1135, 1138-39 (La. 1982) (same); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth, 222 Va. 574, 589, 281 S.E.2d 915, 923 (1981) (same); cf. United States
v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1345-46 (D.C. 1981) (same for pretrial detention hear-
ing), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982); Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 542,
419 A.2d 323, 331 (1980) (Hill, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (advocating
same).
Washington and New Mexico apply this less strict "likelihood" standard when
closure is sought to protect a defendant's sixth amendment right, but apply a stricter
standard to proponents seeking closure for other reasons. State ex rel. New Mexico
Press Ass'n v. Kaufman, 648 P.2d 300, 304 (N.M. 1982); Seattle Times Co. v.
Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 720 (Wash. 1982).
105. Gannett Co v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 398-400 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). The appropriate standard is "'whether a fair trial for the defendant is likely to
be jeopardized by publicity, if members of the press and public are present and free
to report prejudicial evidence that will not be presented to the jury." Id. at 400.
106. Advisory Committee Standard, supra note 102, at 372 advisory committee
note.
107. See id.
108. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
109. Id. at 570; ABA Standards, supra note 94, at 8-3.2, commentary at 8.35.
110. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
111. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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is difficult to imagine a case where closure could be ordered appropri-
ately under this standard."11 2
The ABA," 3 the Advisory Committee," 4 and many members of the
Court 1 5 have recommended that if closure of the suppression hearing
is ordered, a complete record of the events should be kept and released
to the public "as soon as the threat to the ... right has passed." u6The
trial court should indicate in the record the reasons for closure,
thereby facilitating appellate review of closure decisions." 7 In this
manner infringement on the societal interests in open proceedings will
be kept to a minimum. For this reason, as well as the above, the
"'reasonable likelihood of prejudice" standard is more appropriate for
closure of a pretrial suppression hearing.
B. The Alternative to Closure
Both the ABA and Advisory Committee standards require as a
condition of closure that "the prejudicial effect . . . on trial fairness
cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative means."" 8 When a
112. Id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring). The facts of the Nebraska Press case
illustrate this point. In that case, the pretrial publicity concerned the brutal slaying
of a family in a rural Nebraska town of 800 people. The autopsy contained evidence
of necrophilia, yet this publicity was found not to present a clear and present danger
to the defendant's fair trial right. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542-
43 (1976), see L. Tribe, supra note 61, at 626 (1978).
113. ABA Standards, supra note 94, 8-3-2, at 8.32 ("record shall be . . . made
available to the public following the completion of trial or earlier if consistent with
trial fairness").
114. Advisory Committee Standard, supra note 102, at 366-67 ("record. . . shall
be made available to the public following return of the verdict or at such other time
as may be consistent with defendant's right to a fair trial").
115. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979); id. at 400 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 445 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); accord
United States v. Dorfnan, 550 F. Supp. 877, 887 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Poughkeepsie
Newspapers, Inc. v. Rosenblatt, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 1983, at 2, col. 1 (N.Y. App.
Div. Mar. 14, 1983) (per curiam). But cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 597 n.22 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he avail-
ability of a trial transcript is no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself.").
116. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 445 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part).
117. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 446 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 561-62 (3d
Cir. 1982); State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishers v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 912
(Fla. 1977) (Sundberg, J., concurring); Iowa Freedom of Information Council v.
Van Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Iowa 1983): Kansas City Star Co. v. Fossey, 230
Kan. 240, 250, 630 P.2d 1176, 1184 (1981); State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamil-
ton, 267 S.E.2d 544, 552 (W. Va. 1980); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 326
(Wyo. 1979).
118. ABA Standards, supra note 94, 8-3.2, at 8-32; accord Advisory Committee
Standard, supra note 102, at 366; see Judicial Conference Report, supra note 104, at
535.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
defendant requests a judge to close the pretrial suppression hearing
and makes a sufficient showing of a threat to his fair trial right, the
court must examine possible alternatives to closure. 119 Before being
selected as preferable to closure, these alternatives, which may be
suggested by the media 120 or considered sua sponte by the judge,' 21
should be shown to preserve at least as well as closure the guarantee of
a fair trial without infringing to any greater degree upon the interests
of the public and the press in open proceedings.
One alternative suggested by the ABA encourages the use of "volun-
tary fair trial/free press agreements."1 22 Under these pacts, members
of the press agree to certain limitations on the timing and scope of trial
coverage.2 3 These agreements are not enforceable by contempt sanc-
tions, however, and doubts exist about their efficacy.124 Clearly, if a
defendant is forced to rely upon a voluntary, unenforceable agree-
ment he is no longer guaranteed a fair trial.
In response to this problem, the Advisory Committee would allow
the court, in cases where closure would ordinarily be permissible, to
condition media attendance upon an agreement limiting the timing
and extent of disclosure of information. 125 This order is termed a
"partial closure," 12 6 violation of which would be punishable by con-
tempt and would constitute grounds for excluding the violator from
future "partial closures." 2 7
While this novel proposal has not been tested judicially, it appears
to possess characteristics of a prior restraint. Because the press cannot
be enjoined from publishing information it has stolen or received
through a leak, 12 8 it is difficult to imagine that, once a judge allows
119. United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 560 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1345-46 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
120. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 445-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
121. Failure to consider these alternatives may be reversible error. See Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335, 357-58 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723,
726-27 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1961). As the Court stated in
Sheppard: "[R]eversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures
that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps ...
that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences." 384 U.S. at
363.
122. ABA Standards, supra note 94, 8-3.2, commentary at 8.34.
123. Id.
124. See Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 21-22, 633
P.2d 74, 78 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982).
125. Advisory Committee Standard, supra note 102, at 373 advisory committee
note.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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the press to be present at a hearing, he can then prevent the dissemi-
nation of information lawfully gathered at that hearing. 29
Several other alternatives are suggested by the ABA: "(1) continu-
ance, (2) severance, (3) change of venue, (4) change of venire,
(5) intensive voir dire, (6) additional peremptory challenges, (7) se-
questration, and (8) admonitory instructions to the jury."' 30 These
alternatives, however, are not always preferable to closure. ' 3' Contin-
uance, for instance, may violate the defendant's right to a speedy
trial.' 32 Change of venue may infringe on the defendant's right to a
jury trial in the vicinity where the crime occurred.' 33 Intensive voir
dire is ineffective in rooting out unrecognized or unadmitted preju-
dice.134 Sequestration prior to trial is particularly costly to taxpayers
and burdensome on jurors, and may make it difficult to get an ade-
quate venire. '35
CONCLUSION
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial may be jeopardized
by media coverage of a pretrial suppression hearing. Closure of the
129. Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542-43, 561-62 (1976) ("gag
order" preventing publication of information gathered at trial held unconstitu-
tional).
130. ABA Standards, supra note 94, 8-3-2, commentary at 8.34.
131. Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 16-18, 633 P.2d
74, 75-76 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982), Advisory Committee Stan-
dard, supra note 102, at 373 advisory committee note; see Broadcasting Tape Evi-
dence, supra note 71, at 564-65.
132. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971); Federated Publications, Inc.
v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 17, 633 P.2d 74, 75-76 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2257 (1982); see Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980), Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, Report on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D 391, 413 (1968).
133. Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980); Herald Ass'n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 534, 419 A.2d 323, 326 (1980); Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 17, 633 P.2d 74, 76 (1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982); State v. Hughes, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2569, 2570
(Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 1982).
134. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961); Ashland Publishing Co. v.
Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Federated Publications, Inc. v.
Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 17-18, 633 P.2d 74, 76 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2257 (1982); see Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971).
135. Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)
(sequestration not a viable alternative at pretrial suppression hearings); Common-
wealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 475-81, 414 A.2d 318, 347-50 (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(sequestration "impractical, unfair and burdensome"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992
(1980); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 96 Wash. 2d 13, 18, 633 P.2d 74,
76 (1981) (sequestration not a viable alternative for pretrial suppression hearing),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2257 (1982); State v. Hughes, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2569,
2570 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 1982) (sequestration expensive and makes impaneling
an impartial jury difficult); see Advisory Committee Standard, supra note 102, at 373
advisory committee note (sequestration may cause "juror resentment").
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hearing may be sought by the defendant to prevent this harm. On the
other hand, open judicial proceedings are of recognized societal im-
portance. In cases in which the claims of the criminal defendant and
the press conflict, a balance must be struck. If the trial court deter-
mines that a reasonable likelihood of prejudice to the defendant will
result from an open pretrial suppression hearing, and that closure will
be the most effective method to avoid this threat, the hearing should
be closed to the press and the public.
Bernard P. Bell
